Being excerpts from pages 187, 203, 204, 207, 208, 209, 210 and 211 of Uncle Tungsten , extracted by Michael Laing with the consent of the author, Professor Oliver Sacks, and Picador Publishers.

«)La véritable philosophie est la sainteté de la raison. La volonté nous aliène et nous assimile à sa fin, l'entendement nous assimile et nous acquiert son objet): voilà pourquoi, en nous donnant à Dieu par un dévouement total, nous pouvons le mieux pénétrer par le regard); la pureté du détachement intérieur est l'organe de la vision parfaite. On ne peut le voir sans l'avoir, l'avoir sans l'aimer, l'aimer sans lui apporter l'hommage de tout ce qu'il est, pour ne retrouver en (...) tout que sa seule volonté et sa seule présence. Ce qu'il est, nous voulons qu'il le soit, quoi qu'il nous en coûte); et ainsi ce qu'il est en soi, il le devient en nous.)» Si l'on en croit l'aveu de Maurice Blondel, il y aurait dans sa réflexion philosophique un chemin de sainteté, voie étroite vers l'Amour qu'emprunte le philosophe d'Aix. Pour tenter d'en saisir le sens, le présent ouvrage entend réexaminer l'ensemble du projet philosophique blondélien au regard de cette nouvelle perspective. (shrink)

This is a long-awaited reprint of the major work of the late Alexandre Koyré, one of the greatest masterpieces of the history of Western philosophy. The early nineteenth century saw a revival of Boehme studies but even the commentaries of Franz von Baader could not be substituted for a scholarly synthesis of Boehme's thought. Boehme is a universe of his own, and only the immense learning of a man like Koyré, with his rare ability to synthesize and clarify, could have (...) done justice to him. Through and beyond the rich and baroque splendor of the cosmic poetry of the Dawn of the Mysterium Magnum, we see the birth of the modern philosophical spirit. What Boehme offers us is a philosophy of freedom, and, despite the modesty of his comparisons, Koyré does not fail to show how all this anticipates the greatest Idealistic systems.--M. J. V. (shrink)

The emphasis is on extensive textual analysis, concentrated mainly on the Nicomachean Ethics, but making a very generous use of all other writings of the Stagirite. After a long and interesting introduction on Aristotle's method in ethical investigations and on the evolution of his moral philosophy, comes a comprehensive treatment of his theory of happiness: happiness in general, happiness as virtue, happiness and the moral order, the realization of happiness in the practice of wisdom. If the book has a general (...) thesis, it is a kind of apology for Aristotelian ethics as a morality of activity and dynamism which, instead of only aiming at "the formal perfection" of the virtuous man of Plato, opens the way to a theological culmination, to a truly transcendent moral end. Despite an over-abundance of frequently unnecessary quotes from secondary sources, this very scholarly book is a valuable instrument for the systematic reading of the Philosopher from an ethical perspective.—M. J. V. (shrink)

The present book is an interesting essay on Origen's place in the history of Western thought, or better, about the question whether he was a philosopher at all, and if so, in what sense. Because of his intense speculative drive and his wide learning in Neoplatonic thought Origen has been considered to be the "most philosophical" of the Greek Fathers. Such a view very often entails the attempt at "reorganizing" his thought as systematic philosophical reflection. The author's final thesis is (...) that such an approach is doomed to failure in really understanding the Origenian mind. This "pupil" of Ammonius Saccas was above all a Christian theologian and as such an outsider to philosophy. Philosophy had not been taken for granted by him but it was to be probed into from the depth of Christian experience and its theological self-interpretation. Philosophy itself-which means to his mind pagan philosophy—should be treated within the framework of that vast theological enterprise Origen had been carrying through in his whole life. It is only after the analysis of his philosophy of theology that Origen's contribution to philosophy proper can be evaluated. It is in this sense that the author considers his work as a prolegomenon to "Origenian philosophy."—M. J. V. (shrink)

Professor Jankélévitch is one of the very few contemporary moral philosophers without any avowed extra-ethical affiliation. Written in the best tradition of classical French moral thought, penetrated by Neo-Platonic and Christian mysticism, the Russian novel, and French poetry, the present book is Jankélévitch's eleventh work devoted to ethical problems. It describes and analyzes, in a brilliantly rhetorical style, remorse and regret, compensation and consolation, and repentance and sanction, chiefly in the framework of the temporality of "bad conscience." The last section, (...) a highly spirited and interesting apology for the moral efficacy and healing power of the "bad conscience," is intended to be the culmination of the book, yet its most significant philosophical contribution might very well be the thesis that moral conscience and reflective conscience are phenomena different not in degree but in kind.—M. J. V. (shrink)

This is the first good book on the early Schelling since Metzger's study in 1911. What is more, it is an entirely novel interpretation of this first and most productive decade of Schelling's philosophizing. The central thesis is that Schelling's fundamental intuition had always been that of the concrete and particular character of all reality. Reality is a whole and everything real is a whole: an actual closed totality. Even in this most Fichtean period, Schelling did not really accept the (...) transcendental position, and the philosophy of nature allowed him to expand his vision of the concrete into rich and complex constructions. This is a view which one occasionally encounters in other critical writings on Schelling, but it is usually overpowered by the accumulated Hegelian prejudice concerning Schelling's "dogmatism" and "abstract formalism." It is therefore heartening to see the author, without any polemics, challenging the Hegelians on their own favorite hunting-ground: the arid pastures of the philosophy of identity. Although the author does not fully document her findings, and although the System of Transcendental Idealism is almost totally neglected, the book is undoubtedly an important event. It may even signal the opening of new research into the early Schelling. It is immensely useful--and encouraging--for a number of scholars working on the Ages of the World and on the positive philosophy: it helps them to see the continuity in the six decades of Schelling's philosophizing.--M. J. V. (shrink)

The author is one of the greatest contemporary authorities on Classical Jewish philosophy. He applies his vast scholarship to probe into the inter-relationship between medieval Jewish philosophy and the cabala. The profound and daring speculation of the theosophists of the early cabala did not fail to provoke a violent reaction on the part of Jewish scholasticism, and the two long studies in the present volume try to analyze two cases of such antagonistic relationships. The first of the studies is a (...) comparison of the philosophico-theological treatise of Samuel Judah Ibn Tibbon, "The Reconciliation of Philosophy and the Religious Law," with a treatise on the Spanish cabalist Jacob ben Seset. While in this study we see the confrontation of the spirit of Averroes with the cabalistic inspiration, the second essay is devoted to a treatise from the fourteenth century, written by Joseph ben Abraham Ibn Waquar, in which philosophical and cabalistic elements are intimately interwoven in one and the same work. To the two major studies are added ten highly interesting short treatises on cabalistic notions and texts, making the present books together with the writings of Gershon Scholem the most important monument to cabalistic scholarship available in a Western language.—M. J. V. (shrink)

This article is part of a For-Discussion-Section of Methods of Information in Medicine about the paper "Biomedical Informatics: We Are What We Publish", written by Peter L. Elkin, Steven H. Brown, and Graham Wright. It is introduced by an editorial. This article contains the combined commentaries invited to independently comment on the Elkin et al. paper. In subsequent issues the discussion can continue through letters to the editor.

Publication de deux poèmes byzantins du 12ème s. attribués à Théodore Prodomos, qui fournissent un certain nombre de renseignements sur les tentes des camps d'hiver des Comnène, et en particulier sur celle de la maison d'Irène la Sevastokratorissa. Cette étude mène l'auteur à un commentaire historico-artistique des éléments décrits: il compare d'abord ceux-ci avec l'art des 11ème et et 12ème s., et particulièrement avec l'art profane, puis il s'interroge sur l'authenticité des descriptions par rapport aux figures de rhétorique employées dans (...) ces textes. (shrink)

Three experiments are reported which show that in certain contexts subjects reject instances of the valid modus ponens and modus tollens inference form in conditional arguments. For example, when a conditional premise, such as: If she meets her friend then she will go to a play, is accompanied by a conditional containing an additional requirement: If she has enough money then she will go to a play, subjects reject the inference from the categorical premise: She meets her friend, to the (...) conclusion: She will go to a play. Other contexts suppress the conditional fallacies. The first experiment demonstrates the effects of context on conditional reasoning. The second experiment shows that the inference suppression disappears when the categorical premise refers to both of the antecedents, such as: She meets her friend and she has enough money. In this case, subjects make both the valid inferences and the fallacies, regardless of the contextual information. The third experiment establishes that when subjects are given general information about the duration of a situation in which a conditional inducement was uttered, such as: If you shout then I will shoot you, they reject both the valid inferences and the fallacies. The results suggest that the interpretation of premises plays an even more central role in reasoning than has previously been admitted. Trois expériences montrent que dans certains contextes les sujets rejettent des instances valides de modus ponens et de modus tollens dans des énoncés conditionnels. Par exemple, quand une prémisse conditionnelle comme: Si elle rencontre son ami, alors elle ira jouer, est accompagnée par une phrase contenant une condition supplémentaire: Si elle a assez d'argent, alors elle ira jouer, les sujets rejettent l'inférence liant la prémisse catégorielle: Elle rencontre son ami, à la conclusion: Elle ira jouer. D'autres contextes éliminent également les inférences conditionnelles fallacieuses. La premiére expérience démontre l'effet du contexte sur la raisonnement conditionnel. La deuxiéme expérience montre que la suppression de l'inférence disparait quand la prémisse catégorielle fait référence aux deux antécédants, comme: Elle rencontre son ami et elle a assez d'argent. Dans ce cas, les sujets font aussi bien les inférences valides et fallacieuses, quelle que soit l'information contextuelle. La troisiéme expérience établit que quand l'on donne aux sujets des informations générales à propos de la durée d'une situation dans laquelle une conditionnelle a été prononcée, comme Si tu cries, alors je te tire dessus, ils rejettent autant les inférences valides que les inférences fallacieuses. Ces résultats suggèrent que l'interprétation des prémisses joue un rŏle encore plus central dans le raisonnement que l'on admettait auparavant. (shrink)

The numerical study of a glycolytic model formed by a system of three delay differential equations reveals a multiplicity of stable coexisting states: birhythmicity, trirhythmicity, hard excitation and quasiperiodic with chaotic regimes. For different initial functions in the phase space one may observe the coexistence of two different quasiperiodic motions, the existence of a stable steady state with a stable torus, and the existence of a strange attractor with different stable regimes (chaos with torus, chaos with bursting motion, and chaos (...) with different periodic regimes). For a single range of the control parameter values our system may exhibit different bifurcation diagrams: in one case a Feigenbaum route to chaos coexists with a finite number of successive periodic bifurcations, in other conditions it is possible to observe the coexistence of two quasiperiodicity routes to chaos. These studies were obtained both at constant input flux and under forcing conditions. (shrink)

After the monumental works of Xavier Leon and Martial Guéroult, the French have again produced a significant piece of Fichte-interpretation. The author advances two radically new theses: Fichte's philosophy is above all centered around the deduction of the other, and even objectivity as such is based upon inter-subjectivity. The Doctrine of Science, instead of being the foundation of an absolute idealism, teaches that the only knowledge which can be had is empirical knowledge, and all logic is rooted in time. Philonenko (...) claims that Fichte's aim was to uphold the adequacy and essential correctness of common everyday knowledge over against the pretensions of metaphysical speculation. This is a magnificent book: the product of a truly amazing scholarship in the history of philosophy, full of ingenious and highly imaginative rapprochements and insights. It is also another welcome manifestation of that recent continental trend in the interpretation of German idealism which realizes that Fichte and Schelling do not simply fill the gap between Kant and Hegel, but are great philosophers in their own right. If any objection can be made at all against the work, it would be the limitation of its argument to the first period of Fichte's creativity. The author's avowed aim is to confine himself to the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, and, as a matter of fact, we rarely find a quote later than 1798. Indeed, Fichte always claimed that no qualitative change took place in his thought. However, his exposition of it steadily altered, and in view of this, perhaps it is not entirely unjustified to regret that the Wissenschaftslehre of 1804 and the Answeisung zum seligen Leben are not taken into account in interpreting the early Fichte.—M. J. V. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article examine l'argumentation de Sullivan en faveur du principe que toute chose a une cause. On soutient que les critiques de Smith et d'Allen ne lui rendent pas justice et que Sullivan est justifié de maintenir que nous n'avons pas de bonnes raisons de nier la vérité de ce principe. Sa défense finale, cependant, qui semble basée sur une approche thomiste, échoue. Être contingent et être causé sont séparables. Il semble au bout du compte que nous n'ayons pas (...) non plus de bonnes raisons de nier la fausseté du principe en question. (shrink)